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History
In
July 1935, Ministero dell’ Aeronautica invited the leading Italian companies to
draw up plans for new fighter prototypes. Three categories were suggested:
defense, fighter and combat, but a compromise answer was held to be preferable,
capable that is, of satisfying the demands of different roles. While not being
determining factor as regards evaluation, the air cooled radial engine was
recommended; the armament had to consist of two 12, 7 mm machine guns, and
cannon of 20 or 37 mm. In accordance with these terms and deriving it from the
previous designs, Ing. Gabrielli proceeded to a preliminary project of the G 50
fighter aircraft, low winged monoplane, all metal, with retractable
undercarriage, fitted with the new A 74 RC 38 engine. The armament was
constituted of two Safat 12, 7 mm machine guns, ( one in the fuselage, and the
other in the port wing) and of an Oerlikon 20 mm cannon in the starboard wing.
Top speed of 460 km/h at 3500 m was estimated. This project, presented in
September 1935, was subsequently subject of various modifications and
improvements, which considerable altered and improved the pristine line; in the
1935/36 winter, progress was made from the preliminary project to the final
design, with the drawing up of working blueprints for the factory. At the start
of 1936, with a fresh contest, Ministero dell’ Aeronautica invited various
Italian companies to prepare plans for an exclusively defense aligned aircraft,
equipped therefore with lighter armament and not requiring the installation of
internally carried bomb load.
Since design for the G 50 were in that moment at advanced stage, and the radical transformation would entail a postponement of finalization of more than six months, internal bomb load were refused and in that place were positioned fuel tank and lower side was simply covered by metal plate. In the summer of 1936, the CMASA works of Marina di Pisa started preparing the first example and, going all out, was able to complete it in the early weeks of 1937. For the better rigging out of the prototype, the first cycle of flight tests was arranged for the FIAT Aeritalia airport. In February, the G 50 NC 1 was consequently transferred to Turin, followed by CMASA-s test pilot De Briganti. The NC 1, which meanwhile had received the registration MM 334, affected its maiden flight in the afternoon of the 26. February, remaining airborne for 15 minutes. Soon, the second prototype was joining to the tests.
Flights
at the Aeritalia air strip were extended over several months, during which the
fitting out of the plane was proceeded to, and performances were ascertained. In
the summer, the prototype was switched to the Pisa S. Giusto airport, where
CMASA had their own airstrip and then to Guidonia.
In the meantime, on the basis of a first outline appraisal, the Ministry had forwarded CMASA the order for a batch of 45 airplanes, but massive production was to await the outcome of comparative tests with the Macchi MC 200. With the introduction of the all metal structure, the monoplane wing, retractable landing gear and new lines, the fighter speed had achieved a decided leap forward, touching 500 km/h in level flight, with the ability to surpass 700 km/h in the dive; a whole range of problems of stability and controllability, of structural vibration, of engine and propeller to strong bursts at high revs. Certain modifications to the tail fin and to the ailerons were worked out, to improve the stability and controllability- improvements which were incorporated into the aircraft intended for the comparative tests. Permanent problem presented vibrations at high revs and speed and from this reasons was lost second prototype (MM 335) at November 8. 1937 at San Giusto airfield, in 15.30, killing test pilot De Briganti. He was replaced by CMASA test pilot Enzio Guerra.
In the February
of 1938, while at CMASA the fitting out of the first batch of 45 planes was
already at an advanced stage, the appraisal and comparative testes between G 50
and MC 200 began at Guidonia. The different principles according to which the
two aircraft had been designed, played a determining role, inevitably: while the
Macchi had been developed exclusively in response to the demands of the fighter,
pushing performances and manageability to the limit, in the G 50, anticipating
it almost a year, and based on the multipurpose conception, the possibility was
retained of carrying 600 rounds per weapon, and of installing internally bomb
sticks or bomb of various calibers. The armament bay in fact constituted a
weighty influence on the fuselage section, both as regards bulk and aerodynamics
form; afterwards it was simply closed, since its “doing away with” would have
required a more or less total redesigning of the fuselage, and new calculations
regarding the entire aircraft. The G 50 moreover, was prepared for the addition
of a further fuel tank and the possible addition of a 7, 7 mm caliber machine
guns in the wings.
The outcome of the evaluation was favorable to the Macchi MC 200 as far as the various performances were concerned but certain characteristics, such as greater facility of check up’s, inspection and repair and the pilot’s ability to get out with the aircraft turned over, which in the event of military employment, were not negligible, were to be ascribed to the G 50 advantage’s. In effect, with the appraisals brought to a close, the study was requested of only four points in the case of the G 50; open cockpit, mechanical braking device for the undercarriage, self starter system for the engine, and the adoption of oxygen apparatus for great height flights. Initially were planed to manufacture winning C 200 in FIAT plants but thus could delay the productions for up to six months and moreover, for manufacture of Macchi fighter 20000 working hours are required.
The request to
alter the cockpit of the G 50 (and similarly that of the MC 200) from closed to
open, was no by means a minor modification requirement, representing a serious
problem aerodynamically. Cockpit hood was deformed at high speed and presented
problem to open and that could be very hazardous for possible rescue of pilot.
That was the main reason to open cockpit. It was thus decided to bring out a
sample aircraft, modifying a G 50 from pre series and, studying the results, to
modify the series, for which the contract was in course of being implemented.
The flight tests of the sample aircraft for the I series (MM 3571) brought to light how many problems derived from to open cockpit, without obtaining results regarding visibility sufficient to justify the shortcomings that resulted from it. Various types of windscreen were tested, to limit aerodynamics disturbance that affected the tail, with consequent vibrations; this without taking into account the diminution of the top speed which was a consequence and the pilot’s discomfort and reduced visibility. In spite of these things, a compromise solution having been found after various experiments, it was adopted for the production of the following series of aircraft. All these tests could not fail to delay its construction and the consignment of modified G 50’s was not able to begun until the autumn of 1939.
At the beginning of the autumn of 1938 a dozen productions G 50 had been already flight tested and delivered to the first operational unit intended to use in Spain for evaluation in combat conditions. Unit was based on Ciampino and for commander was nominated Major Mario Bonzano, air ace from Spanish war. Interest to send the type in Spain goal back to the 1937, when the nationalist air ace, Joaquin Garcia Morato, was tested prototype at Guidognia airfield.
This
unit, denominated Gruppo Sperimentale da Caccia (Experimental Fighters Group)
reached the Spanish front in the January 1939, being located at Escalona, and 70
km away from Madrid. The participation of the G 50 in the military operations
which brought the war in Spain to a close was not very intense and basically
served experimental ends. Most activities present high altitude escort. Some of
planes were damaged due to the problem of absence of lock mechanism for landing
gear. In May 1939 all G 50 was ceded to the Spanish Air Force. They had served
in 27. Gruppo Caza and from 1943 they were in Spanish Morocco, in 2. Regimento
Mixto, aside with German He112B
Following contract between the Italian government and that of Finland, concerning the supply to that country of material of war, a group of Finish pilots was seconded to Turin at the end of 1938, to examine the G 50. The evaluation had positive results and in 1939 the agreement was reached whereby 35 planes should be sold to Finland. On account of the cockpit modifications, production was subject to some delay and it was only towards the end of the year that the first G 50’s were sent to Rome, for the military acceptability flights on the part of the Finnish pilots. In November, during one of these test flights, Lt. Trapuni Harmaja, affecting a dive from 3500 m, reached speed of 830 km/h, a speed which could be claimed as the highest achieved by an Italian aircraft.
Fourteen G 50
shipped to Finland in the January of 1940 and was assigned to LeLV 26, stationed
at Utti, which was able to embark on familiarization flights with the new plane
right from the early days of February. The remaining aircraft arrived until the
June while two were lost on ferry. The cessation of the war between Russians and
Finns caught the unit whilst it was still at the training stage.
The momentary period of tranquility allowed the LeLV 26 to fit out, including with some improvements, “Fiju”, nickname given by Finish pilots, which suffered from extremely harsh Artic temperatures. For example, for certain aircraft a special spinner was fitted, of which the construction was commissioned in Sweden, which was to safeguard the airscrew boss, to protect from freezing of the oil.
The re-opening of hostilities between Finland and USSR, in June 1941, also involved the G 50, which joined the first line, along with LeLV 26, until the May 1944. The able and aggressive pilots of this unit, succeeded in winning more than few victories in the frequent encounters with the adversary aircraft; Oiva Tuomimen , the first Finn pilot to be decorated, in August 1941, with the “Manerheim Cross” distinguished himself exceptionally. Operationally were used until the 1947 and last survived was scraped in 1956.
Before its collapse in short war, Royal Yugoslavia has brought from Italy some Macchi 200 but they were not delivered. On these base new Croatian state requested from Italy deliver of these planes. Ina reason of permanent deserting from the Croatian forces and massive crime against Serbian population, Italian government refuse any delivery. But possibility to get some strategic materials changes this decision but not to Macchi but to less capable G 50, one of these two seat. Delivery was done in Jun 1942.
According to the
Programma R, program of the strengthening of the Aviation, the G 50ought to have
equipped one Stormo and one Gruppo (Stormo-regiment or wing, Gruppo-group). The
first unit to receive this plane was the 51. St. C.T. (Caccia Terrestre- land
fighter), based at Ciampino Sud, which became operational in the 1939/40 winter.
Very soon, unit had it first success on exercise, when they pursuit and catch
opposing bomber from 12. Stormo B.T. Unit emblem was three green mouse and new
emblem of 51. gruppo became black cat catching three green mice. With the
revision of Programma R, the consistency of the unit of G 50’s was increased to
two Stormo; thus the 52. Stationed at Pontedera and Sarzana, for the moment,
only 22. Gruppo were equipped with G 50’s the 24. Gruppo still with CR 32’s was
awaiting replacement.
In the moment when Italy entered the war, Jun 10. 1940, the two Stormo disposed of 118 G 50 whilst another 30, about, were in course of delivery. First unit to have an action was the 22. Gruppo of Pontedera, carrying out, between 15. and 19. June several missions over Corsica, escorting S. 79’s. At June 16. sergeant Lui Malagoli from 355. squadriglia lost its life above the sea and this is the first combat victim of G 50. The same Gruppo, after having been transferred to the north, from Rome to Genoa and took part in the Alpine sector, in the operations against France. War against France was over at June 24.
Some after
the conclusion of their actions against the France, the Staff ordered the
constitution of a Corpo Aereo Italiano (Italian Air Corps), destined to operate,
based on Belgium, against England. The 20. Gruppo (G 50) was chosen, led by
Mario Bonzano, to form part of the 56. Stormo C.T., which was being set up,
detaches it from the 51. Stormo. At the October 19. the G 50’s together with the
CR 42’s of the 18. Gruppo, were switched to Belgium, being drawn at the Ursel
base. Next day C.A.I. technical services, in collaboration with CMASA’s
technicians, started work on fitting armor plates, both in the G. 50’s and in
the CR 42’s. Activities begin at October 29. 1940, when the G 50 escort bomber
raid on Ramsgate. For the G 50, which was made for the Mediterranean conditions,
Belgian theatre was a great shock. Temperature at operation height was down as
-50 and instruments, fuel and battery liquid were frozen. Moreover, ARC 1 radio
unit was not in radio frequency range with German radio units and the
cooperation’s could not be made. In January 1941, 351. return to Italy for
reequipping to new bis model and then sent to Africa. Other units, 352. and 353.
, remained in Belgium, now within JG.56, and operate alongside with new Bf109F
fighters. G. 50 affected 662 sorties but having no encounter with the enemy,
they have no aerial victories. Four craft were lost in accidents with a lost of
two pilots.
While the
G.50 of the 20. Gruppo C.T. were going into action over the channel, another
front was opening up- The Greek one. In the October, to accompany Italian
offensive, eighty G.50 were available, located with the 24. and the 154. Gruppo
in Berat in Albania and with the 2. Gruppo, at Grottaglie, near Bari .For this
operations, Italy had almost intact forces as well looses in the France and
Belgium was minimal. Greece was first serious Italian operation but the Italian
staff does not take any special attention and preparation for operation was done
in only two weeks. Attack begins at October 28. but Greeks stopped attack after
four day’s and went in the successful counter strike. After the first week’s,
during which the unit’s were employed almost exclusively for support of ground
forces and flying low level and low speed was a critical to the G 50 which had a
tendency to stall. Weather conditions were not good, as well of 176 days of
operations only 86 was good for flying. That was used by RAF, which crew was at
high training level and took many action at night or bad weather conditions. G
50 had high score action with attack on Paramitia airfield at March 22. 1941.
The G.50 thus often found them involved with RAF Gladiator and at times also with Hurricane’s. Especially with the Gladiator, G.50, thanks to its greater speed, could easily enough impose a pattern to their liking on the skirmishes, according to the tactic which was most congenial to them. Also the behavior of the machine in the adverse winter environment, more than came up to expectations.
Reports of the unit commanding officer’s are in agreement that after a brief period of operative acclimatizing, pilots were at their ease with the G.50. The one and only inconvenient factor was a certain hardness regarding to the controls, which made it unadvisable to go in for maneuvered combat, in which Gladiator would have had advantage. At the April 6. 1941 start campaign against Yugoslavia, where the G 50 had several escort sorties.
Towards the
end of 1939 it was decided, in accordance with the ministry, to affect a series
of modifications on the G.50, to improve certain characteristics. The principal
variations were to partially redesign fuselage, rendering retractable tail wheel
and to increase fuel volume from 316 to 419 liter. In the summer of 1940, CMASA
completed the production of 244 G.50 and proceeded to modify tooling in order to
adopt it new shape G.50, marked “bis”. In the same time FIAT Aeritalia had
received an order for 315 G.50bis and rapidly set up a production line for the
new model.
The first flights took place in the period September to November 1940 and served for various fitting to the craft. A slight delay in the delivery of the first production samples was caused by necessity for introducing certain devices to obviate the harmful effects caused by the use in the desert North African theatres. In fact, a progressive series of inefficiencies due to sand came to light, with the units which operated in Africa. At the beginning of 1941, both CMASA and FIAT Aeritalia started delivery of G.50 bis AS to the units in Africa.
During the operations in Greece was opened African theatre. In December 1941 there were placed 358. sq., 2. Gruppo and 155. Gruppo with total of 76 G 50. Problem which was not timely considered were sand and importance to equip the planes with filters. That was soon solved but due to the dust problems only a handful of G 50 was in flying conditions during the British offensive in February. But the worst problem presented Ally fighters which was too heavy match and most of them being Hurricanes and P-40. Besides convoy escort missions, the G.50 took part in the various offensives and counter offensives which developed, operating both as a fighter as well support mission. For that purpose, bomb racks were installed beneath the wings, in 1942. By the end of 1941 there arrive famous 20. Gruppo but unit suffered heavy losses at 19. November 1941, when British armor unit “Queens Own Hussars” attack their airfield and destroy 18 planes on ground. After El Alamein offensive only 368. Squadriglia assalto operated G 50 in the theatre. Units were based at Sfax under the command of the captain Ferrero. The war in Africa having been brought to close with the loss of Tunisia, the subsequent phase was the Sicily landing. Among the units which took part in these actions were 158. and 159. Gruppo Assalto. Due to the Ally air superiority and effective naval anti aircraft fire these units were disintegrated in just a few days.
On the September
8. 1943, at the moment of the Armistice, there were 47 G.50 remained in Italy
and Mediterranean area and only 17 were operational. The few remaining G.50 were
used in North Italy and they were concentrated at Malpensa, mostly used for
training of the pilot’s of R.S.I. (Republica Sociale Italiana). One sample of
G.50 B was used as a trainer until the end of forties and then was scraped.
Full data available on CD